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06-18-2018
02:51 PM
Geoffrey Shelton Okot Thanks for your answer. Unfortunately for me, it leads to more (inner) questions 😉 1) While the client/Kerberos dialogs are well-described with a non-encrypted secret key for the client (described in Wikipedia), I have not found yet a description explaining how parties agree to work together, when the client side has only an encrypted secret key in a keytab. 2) I don't see why things are improved after encrypting the secret key in a keytab. AFAIU one identity could be stolen when copying a keytab, and then, in that case, having, inside the keytab, a secret key, encrypted or not, does not look like to change anything related to keytab copy protection. Some things are still obscure for me. About (1) : do you have any link pointing to a protocol detail description when working with an encrypted secret key in a keytab ? Thanks again.
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05-21-2018
06:32 PM
2 Kudos
Hello @Dominique De Vito Yes, Knox does work with unsecure Hadoop custer and yes you can use KnoxSSO with unsecure cluster as well.
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03-19-2018
01:21 PM
@dvillarreal oops, I have missed that ones. Thanks for pointing me policy change/update traces/audits.
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01-31-2018
12:13 PM
1 Kudo
Almost all the tools that are using authorization are based on usernames to authorize. I.e. in Ranger you configure username to allow access. And most of the tools could use an authorization different to Kerberos, so all of them need a mapping from the Kerberos principal to a username. If you have configured SSH to accept Kerberos authentication, the system still needs to know which user has been authenticated i.e. to determine the home dir and to start the user specific environment
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01-23-2018
03:53 PM
Hi Dominique, yes thats correct.
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